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INTRODUCTION
Indigenous peoples’ right to free, prior and informed consent(“FPIC”) is gaining increasing currency in internationallaw, particularly in the jurisprudence of international human
rights bodies and pursuant to the Convention on Biological
Diversity.  In some areas, such as use of traditional knowledge,
resettlement and certain development-related activities affecting
indigenous peoples’ traditional lands, the law is clear: indige-
nous peoples have the right to give or withhold their consent.
FPIC has also been recognized and accepted by a number of
intergovernmental organizations and international bodies (see
Box 1) and increasingly in domestic laws and jurisprudence.  
The World Bank Group (“WBG”) is a notable exception
despite two major reviews, both commissioned by the WBG,
which recommend incorporation of FPIC into WBG policy and
practice with special reference to indigenous peoples.  The first
was the World Commission on Dams, which made detailed rec-
ommendations in relation to FPIC,1 all of which were rejected
by the WBG.2 The second, and focus of this article, the World
Bank’s Extractive Industries Review (“EIR”), is presently under
consideration by WBG management prior to submission to the
Board of Directors.3 In a leaked January 2004 WBG manage-
ment response to the EIR’s Final Report, the WBG again reject-
ed FPIC.  The WBG has also stated its opposition to FPIC on a
number occasions in the past eight years in response to indige-
nous peoples’ long standing demands that FPIC must be a fun-
damental component of WBG safeguard policies.  This short
article provides an overview of the EIR and its implications for
the WBG, and takes a closer look at FPIC, its components and
its bases in international law.
THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REVIEW
The EIR was commissioned in 2001 by the President of the
WBG, James Wolfensohn, to examine what role, if any, the
WBG has in the oil, gas, and mining sectors, generically known
as extractive industries (“EI”).  This was done largely in
response to a concerted campaign by non-governmental organi-
zations, Friends of the Earth in particular, who rallied around the
slogan “World Bank Get Your Ass out of Oil and Gas”.
President Wolfensohn appointed Dr. Emil Salim, former
Indonesian minister for the environment, as the “Eminent
Person” charged with conducting the EIR in July 2001.
The EIR comprised a two year-long process of regional
“stakeholder” meetings, project site visits, commissioned
research on particular issues, consideration of two internal
WBG evaluations relating to extractive industries,4 and dia-
logue with World Bank staff.5 The EIR’s Final Report, present-
ed to the WBG in January 2004, was authored by Dr. Salim and
contains a number of potentially far reaching recommendations
about how the WBG conducts business and how human rights,
including indigenous peoples’ rights and FPIC, should be
accounted for and respected in WBG policies and operations.6
While restricted to EI, these recommendations affect a wide
range of WBG operations in other sectors as well as cross-cut-
ting policy issues.
THE EIR’S RECOMMENDATIONS
Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable Development
The WBG’s professed mission and mandate is poverty alle-
viation through sustainable development.7 The EIR assessed
WBG involvement in EI primarily along these lines: can EI
projects be compatible with the WBG’s goals of sustainable
development and poverty reduction? The Final Report defines
poverty from a human rights perspective, adopting the views of
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,8
and centres sustainable development on human beings, commu-
nities, and societies rather than on purely economic grounds
(various forms of capital).9 It also recognizes that for indige-
nous peoples, poverty alleviation and sustainable development
may have additional or nuanced interpretations and require-
ments and must include effective guarantees for territorial rights
and the right to self-determination.10
Noting that EI projects do not necessarily contribute to
poverty alleviation,11 the Final Report recommends that the
WBG should not increase its involvement in EI projects without
addressing a series of prior conditions.12 These conditions
relate both to borrower and corporate governance as well as
institutional reforms within the WBG.  The three main
“enabling conditions” for EI to contribute to poverty alleviation
are defined as: 1) pro-poor public and corporate governance,
including proactive planning and management to maximize
poverty alleviation through sustainable development; 2) respect
for human rights; and 3) much more effective WBG social and
environmental policies.13
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Governance Criteria
The Final Report asserts that, if the WBG is to comply with
its poverty alleviation mandate, strict conditions must be applied
to EI projects.  One of these (pre)conditions is the need to assess
and strengthen governance. In addition to issues such as revenue
sharing and corruption, specified governance criteria include (at
the macro level): the quality of the rule of law; the absence of
armed conflict or a high risk of such conflict; the government’s
respect for labour standards and human rights, as indicated by its
ratification of and adherence to international human rights
treaties; and recognition of and willingness to protect the inter-
nationally guaranteed rights of indigenous peoples.14
Human Rights
Quoting from the Final Declaration of the 1993 Vienna
World Conference on Human Rights, the Final Report con-
cludes, “while development facilitates the enjoyment of all
human rights, the lack of development may not be invoked to
justify the abridgement of internationally recognized human
rights.”15 It further concludes that that the “WBG must inter-
nalize and respect this principle, both in terms of its operating
polices and in its relations with borrowers and clients;”16 and,
highlighting labour rights, indigenous peoples’ rights, and
women’s rights, this “must reflect and be consistent with the
WBG’s obligations as a subject of international law and
account for the obligations incumbent upon its borrowers by
virtue of ratified human rights instruments and customary inter-
national law.”17
Following these conclusions, the Final Report recommends
that, among others, the WBG:
• Develops a system-wide policy that integrates and
mainstreams human rights into all areas of WBG
policy and practice and ensures that its polices and
operations are, at a minimum, consistent with its
obligations, as a subject of international law, in rela-
tion to international human rights law; 
• Ensures that it does not undermine the ability of its
member countries to faithfully fulfil their interna-
tional obligations or facilitate or assist violation of
those obligations.  … At a minimum, the WBG
should assess state obligations and ensure that its
operations, including macro-level intervention such
as structural adjustment, do not violate those obliga-
tions; 
• Systematically incorporates experienced, independ-
ent, and reputable third parties to verify the status of
human rights in all relevant projects; 
• Establishes a central human rights unit, with region-
al counterparts, with a clear policy and a mandate
for monitoring, verification, and transparent annual
audits; 
• Should assess the human rights records of compa-
nies, particularly regarding the International Finance
Corporation (“IFC”) and the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”) including their poli-
cies on human rights and indigenous peoples, and
should ensure that funded projects are designed and
implemented in a manner consistent with applicable
international human rights standards.18 Adoption of
and demonstrated compliance with human rights
principles should be a prerequisite for companies
seeking IFC and MIGA support for extractive indus-
tries;
• Should ideally adopt a rights-based approach to
development and ensure that its support for projects
is directed toward fulfilling internationally guaran-
teed human rights, and, in particular, it should
address power imbalances that affect the full exer-
cise and enjoyment of all human rights by the poor
and most vulnerable.19
These recommendations partly coincide with the findings
of the WBG’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman in a report on
IFC and MIGA involvement with EI done for the EIR.
Observing that neither IFC nor MIGA systematically consider
human rights and labour rights in relation to EI projects, the
report stated that:
This is not to suggest that wider human rights concerns
in individual countries should serve as a barrier to
entry of IFC or MIGA (unless this is the stated policy
of the World Bank group). Instead, IFC and MIGA
should more systematically consider potential risks to
human rights at the project level, take appropriate steps
to mitigate them, and provide clear guidance to clients
on both of these aspects. Where relevant, these aspects
should be reported on at the project level.20
Another internal evaluation also recommended increased
attention to human rights in the context of WBG safeguard and
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The [World Bank Group]
cannot hope to gain “broad
community acceptance” if
indigenous peoples . . . are
from the outset told that
their agreement is not an
issue. . .
other policies, particularly where these policies lag behind
industry best practice.21
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
The Final Report acknowledges indigenous peoples’ large-
ly negative experiences with EI and observes that “[f]ailure to
recognize and respect [their] rights undermines efforts to allevi-
ate indigenous peoples’ poverty and to achieve sustainable
development.”22 Recommendations are made on a number of
issues including the right to free, prior and informed consent;
the right to be free from involuntary resettlement; prior recogni-
tion of and respect for indigenous peoples’ rights to own and
control their traditional lands, territories and resources; and the
revision of the current World Bank safeguard policy on indige-
nous peoples.
Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
The Final Report concludes that “indigenous peoples and
other affected parties do have the right to participate in decision-
making and to give their free,
prior and informed consent
throughout each phase of a proj-
ect cycle. FPIC should be seen
as the principal determinant of
whether there is a “social license
to operate” and hence is a major
tool for deciding whether to sup-
port an operation.”23
Accordingly, the Final Report
recommends that the “WBG
should ensure that borrowers
and clients engage in consent
processes with indigenous peo-
ples and local communities
directly affected by oil, gas, and
mining projects, to obtain their
free, prior and informed con-
sent.”24 It specifies that FPIC is
an internationally guaranteed right for indigenous peoples and
part of “obtaining social license and demonstrable public
acceptance for the project [in the case of non-indigenous local
communities].”25 The Final Report further recommends that
“the WBG should ensure that indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC
is incorporated and respected in its Safeguard Policies and proj-
ect related instruments;”26 and “[r]esettlement should only be
allowed if the indigenous community has given free and prior
informed consent, there are guarantees of a right to return once
the reason for resettlement ceases to exist, and subsequent to
agreement on resettlement benefits.”27
With regard to the nature of FPIC, the Final Report states:
Free prior and informed consent should not be under-
stood as a one-off, yes-no vote or as a veto power for a
single person or group. Rather, it is a process by which
indigenous peoples, local communities, government,
and companies may come to mutual agreements in a
forum that gives affected communities enough leverage
to negotiate conditions under which they may proceed
and an outcome leaving the community clearly better
off. Companies have to make the offer attractive
enough for host communities to prefer that the project
happen and negotiate agreements on how the project
can take place and therefore give the company a “social
license” to operate.  Clearly, such consent processes
ought to take different forms in different cultural set-
tings. However, they should always be undertaken in a
way that incorporates and requires the FPIC of affected
indigenous peoples and local communities.28
Finally, the Final Report recommends that it is “necessary
to include covenants in project agreements that provide for mul-
tiparty negotiated and enforceable agreements that govern vari-
ous project activities, should indigenous peoples and local com-
munities consent to the proj-
ect.”29 This is an interesting
idea that deserves considera-
tion, particularly given the doc-
umented deficiencies in the
WBG’s implementation of its
safeguard policies.30 The proj-
ect agreement is the primary
legal document pertaining to a
project and would presumably
accord indigenous peoples
standing to challenge (further)
implementation of the project
in cases of alleged breach.
Prior Recognition of
Rights to Lands,
Territories, and Resources
The Final Report empha-
sizes the importance to indigenous peoples of secure and effec-
tive territorial rights and concludes that failure to recognize
these rights “undermines efforts to alleviate indigenous peoples’
poverty and to achieve sustainable development” and “jeopard-
ize[s] the potential for development and poverty alleviation
from the extractives sector.”31 It further concludes that
“[s]tructural reforms and legal codes that provide for automatic
approval of exploration and development concessions on
indigenous lands, territories, and resources without the partici-
pation and the free prior and informed consent of these peoples
and communities only exacerbate the problem.”32
The corresponding recommendations state that “the WBG
should not support extractive industry projects that affect
indigenous peoples without prior recognition of and effective
guarantees for indigenous peoples’ rights to own, control, and
manage their lands, territories, and resources” and “the WBG
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Without secure and
enforceable rights to
lands, territories and
resources, indigenous
peoples’ means of
subsistence, their identity
and survival, are
permanently threatened.
should promote only those “sector reforms” that concomitantly
recognize and guarantee indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, ter-
ritories, and resources traditionally owned or otherwise occu-
pied and used by them.”33
The WBG’s own internal review of its safeguard policy on
indigenous peoples reached the same conclusion in April 2003:
It is important to consider the customary rights of
[indigenous peoples] to land when determining adverse
effects, especially where such land is not yet legally
titled. This is important even in technical assistance proj-
ects that involve institutional and regulatory changes to
facilitate increased investment in exploitation of natural
resources. In such cases there may be need for
[Indigenous Peoples Development Plans] that ensure
adequate measures or regulatory frameworks are in
place to protect legitimate [indigenous peoples’] inter-
ests, should such commercial exploitation materialize.34
Compensatory Off-sets
Compensatory offsets are required under the World Bank’s
safeguard policy on Natural Habitats for projects that cause a
significant conversion of natural habitat.35 Should this occur,
borrowers are required to establish “off-sets,” such as national
parks and other protected areas to compensate for habitat loss.
Indigenous peoples have complained that in some cases they are
negatively affected by an extractive project and that their rights
are further infringed by the establishment of an off-set.36 The
Final Report therefore recommends that “[s]pecial attention
must always be paid to ensuring that the rights of indigenous
peoples to their lands, territories, and resources traditionally
owned or otherwise occupied and used are respected when
choosing and designing an offset.”37
Submarine and Riverine Tailings Disposal
The EIR Report notes that submarine and riverine disposal
of mining wastes has had a sometimes severe, negative impact
on indigenous peoples and local communities.  Consequently, it
“recommends that submarine and riverine tailings disposal not
be used in areas such as coral reefs that have important ecolog-
ical functions or cultural significance or in coastal waters used
by indigenous peoples and local communities for subsistence
purposes.”38
Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples 
The Final Report notes that Operational Directive 4.20 on
Indigenous Peoples 1991, the WBG’s current safeguard policy, is
presently being converted to a new format known as draft
Operational Policy/Best Practice 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples.39 It
also observes that the present draft has been “repeatedly repudiat-
ed by indigenous peoples” and concludes that “[t]o be legitimate
and effective, a Safeguard Policy must be seen by the intended
beneficiaries to provide adequate safeguards and must be consis-
tent with their internationally guaranteed rights. This is presently
not the case [with draft OP 4.10].”40 It recommends that:
• With the meaningful participation of indigenous peo-
ple, the WBG should revise its safeguard policy on
indigenous peoples and ensure that it is consistent
with indigenous peoples’ rights in international law;
• The WBG must also ensure that there is consensus
among indigenous peoples about the contents of the
policy – the policy’s beneficiaries must consider that
it provides adequate safeguards; and
• The WBG should refrain from approving the cur-
rent draft OP 4.10 before high-level discussions
with indigenous peoples, including a legal round-
table discussion between WBG lawyers, indigenous
representatives, and legal experts on the consisten-
cy of the policy with internationally guaranteed
human rights.41
Highlighting the importance of attention to indigenous peo-
ples’ rights in relation to OP 4.10, Dr. Salim’s letter to President
Wolfensohn submitted with the Final Report in January 2004
states that “the revision of the safeguard policy on indigenous
peoples is a fundamental test of the World Bank’s commitment
to poverty alleviation through sustainable development.”42
“Phase Out” of Oil and Coal by 2008
The EIR recommends that the WBG “phases out” invest-
ment in oil production and maintains its current freeze on new
coal projects, and, instead, focuses on investment in and pro-
motion of renewable energy sources.43 For many indigenous
peoples, especially those in the Artic and small island states, cli-
mate change is a pressing and very real concern.44 Therefore,
this recommendation is seen as a valuable step in assisting states
to meet the targets set by the Kyoto Protocol, particularly as the
WBG has a strong influence on policy development and legisla-
tive reform initiatives in many of its borrower countries.45 It
has been correctly noted that this recommendation will not
affect some of the major producers of greenhouse gasses, such
as the United States. 
WBG Accountability/Institutional Issues
The preceding issues are all in someway related to larger
issues about the role of the WBG, particularly in light of its
mandate of poverty alleviation through sustainable develop-
ment, its institutional standards and procedures and its account-
ability to not only its member states, but also to those affected
by its operations.  In the Final Report, particular attention is
given to the WBG’s safeguard policies as these are held up by
the WBG as front line protection for persons, communities and
peoples who may be affected by its operations.
On safeguard policies, the Final Report concludes that
“[t]he reality in the field suggests that the current Safeguard
Policies have been unable to ensure that ‘no harm is done’ and
that this is due to both poor implementation rates and deficien-
cies in the policies themselves.”46 In so concluding, it quotes a
2002 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department report,
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which states that “performance in the area of safeguards has
been only partially satisfactory.  Fundamental reform of imple-
mentation and accountability processes is crucial. . . . The cur-
rent system does not provide the appropriate accountability
structure to meet the WBG’s commitments to incorporate envi-
ronmental sustainability into its core objectives and to main-
stream the environment into its operations.”47
Concerning safeguard policies and human rights, the Final
Report recommends that the “WBG should make explicit the
human rights basis for each Safeguard Policy; where a policy
may lie outside international human rights law, it should be
brought into line with current thinking and standards. The
Safeguard Policies should become an explicit tool for ensuring
that the WBG respects human rights, and the staff in extractive
industries should receive adequate training to be able to imple-
ment the human rights dimensions of these policies.”48 It adds
that “[c]ompliance rates with existing Safeguard Policies are
often far below acceptable and, in some cases, the substance of
the policies is inconsistent with internationally recognized
rights. Much greater emphasis needs to be placed on ensuring
compliance with Safeguard Policies and the consistency of these
policies with human rights.”49
Discussing institutional issues in general, the Final Report
concludes that “crucially, WBG does not appear to be set up to
effectively facilitate and promote poverty alleviation through
sustainable development;”50 and “the institution itself needs to
implement a number of serious reforms—changes in the compo-
sition of its portfolio, improvements and reinforced implementa-
tion of its Safeguard Policies, increased coordination across the
arms of the WBG, and changes in WBG staff incentives.”51
THE DRAFT MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE EIR
As part of the terms of reference for the EIR, WBG man-
agement committed to providing a response to the recommen-
dations developed by Dr. Salim prior to submitting the Final
Report to its Board of Executive Directors.  A draft Management
Response (“dMR”) was “leaked” in January 2004.52 The dMR
is not encouraging for those who believe that respect for human
rights, including indigenous peoples’ rights, is fundamental to
poverty alleviation and sustainable development and requires
much greater attention by the WBG.  For the most part there is
no substantive response to EIR recommendations on human
rights and indigenous peoples’ rights; the dMR repeatedly says
that these are under consideration as part of other ongoing inter-
nal reviews and that a formal response or position is dependent
on their outcomes.  On certain specific issues, however, a
response is proffered.  The dMR, for instance, rejects FPIC, stat-
ing that “[g]overnments and industry do not support free prior
informed consent, where this would represent a veto on devel-
opment.”53 Instead, “[t]he WBG will continue to aim for broad
community acceptance of developments that impact them…”54
and “[d]iscussions with communities need to take place in the
context of local law which may or may not give rights [of] prior
informed consent ….”55
None of these three arguments is tenable. First, some gov-
ernments and some industry groups do in fact support FPIC.  A
number of governments have included the right in their domes-
tic legislation and have supported it in international fora.56
Industry groups such as the International Petroleum Industry
Environmental Conservation Association and the International
Association of Oil & Gas Producers have stated, as quoted in the
Final Report, that “it is important for communities to be able to
give free and informed consent.”57 While a number of govern-
ments and EI companies are vociferously opposed to FPIC, the
WBG should be questioned about whether the EI companies and
governments should be allowed to veto indigenous peoples’
human rights.
Second, the WBG cannot hope to gain “broad community
acceptance” if indigenous peoples and communities are from
the outset told that their agreement is not an issue.  As the Final
Report concludes, FPIC should be seen as the principal deter-
minant of whether there is community acceptance, or in indus-
try terms, a social license to operate, and hence is a principal
tool to be used in deciding whether to support the operation.
This is all the more important given that the WBG’s own per-
formance evaluations have found that indigenous peoples’ par-
ticipation in WBG projects is typically “low,”58 and that only 38
percent of a sample of WBG projects which applied the safe-
guard policy on indigenous peoples satisfactorily mitigated
adverse impacts and ensured benefits for indigenous peoples.59
Moreover, one review found that “project results for [indige-
nous peoples] were not as satisfactory in the energy and mining,
transportation, and environment sectors, which comprised 65
percent of Bank commitments evaluated for this second phase,
and include projects with significant potential to harm IP.  The
majority of these projects neither mitigated adverse effects on
[indigenous peoples] nor ensured that they received an equitable
share of benefits.”60 Sustainability of results for indigenous
peoples in all project types was also generally much lower than
overall project sustainability indicators.61
As to the third argument, it is ironic that WBG management
justifies rejection of FPIC on the basis of compliance with the
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[World Bank Group]
studies . . . have
recognised the economic
costs of discrimination
against indigenous
peoples.
law.  As discussed below, FPIC is an internationally guaranteed
right for indigenous peoples that is a source of obligation for the
vast majority of the Bank’s borrowers, obligations the Bank is
bound by international law not to undermine.62 International
law protects the rights of indigenous peoples to their tradition-
ally used and occupied lands.  These rights include FPIC regard-
less of whether a state’s domestic law recognizes those rights.
Furthermore, existing WBG policies rightfully require borrow-
ers to comply with conditions not established by domestic law.
Indigenous peoples’ right to participate, for instance, is not rec-
ognized in the laws of a number of countries, yet the WBG’s
present policy requires such participation in WBG-financed
operations. Also, WBG policy is not to support a project that
employs forced or child labour irrespective of whether national
law prohibits these practices.  
Finally, it is relevant in this context to note that the Bank’s
Operational Policy 4.01 on Environmental Assessment clearly
states that “the Bank takes into account … the obligations of the
country, pertaining to project activities, under relevant interna-
tional environmental treaties and agreements. The Bank does not
finance project activities that would contravene such country obli-
gations, as identified during the [Environmental Assessment].”63
OP 4.36 on Forestry similarly states that “the Bank does not
finance projects that contravene applicable international environ-
mental agreements.”64 If this is possible with regard to environ-
mental obligations, is there a compelling reason why human
rights obligations should not be accorded equal status?
THE JUNE 2004 MANAGEMENT RESPONSE
On 17 June 2004, the WBG released its formal
Management Response (“MR”) to the EIR, along with a notice
that its Board of Executive Directors had delayed consideration
of the Final Report and Management Response pending conclu-
sion of a 30 day period of public comment.65 While the MR as
a whole deserves consideration, particularly as much of it fails
to adequately address the EIR’s recommendations, I will focus
here only on how it addresses FPIC. 
As discussed above, the EIR clearly recommends that the
Bank should not fund projects unless indigenous peoples’
free, prior and informed consent has been obtained.  However,
the standard proposed in the MR can be boiled down to free,
prior and informed consultation  resulting in informed partic-
ipation that leads to “broad community acceptance” of the
project.  The MR adds that the “Bank Group will only support
extractive industry projects that have the broad support of
affected communities (including Indigenous Peoples commu-
nities). This does not mean a veto power for individuals or
any group, but it does mean that the Bank Group requires a
process of free, prior, and informed consultation with affect-
ed communities that leads to broad acceptance by them of the
project.”66 This point is repeated in the Annex, which says
that “[d]iscussions with communities should provide mean-
ingful consultation and result in informed participation. The
Bank Group will support only those extractive industry proj-
ects that have the broad support of affected communities. …
Our Indigenous Peoples policy is being revised to reflect this
principle, and will be discussed by the Board of Executive
Directors shortly.”67
The only language in the draft Indigenous Peoples Policy
(“OP”) that could be construed to be consistent with the above
statements in the MR is in paragraph 15 (“Disclosure and Bank
Review”).  Paragraph 15 reads: 
Throughout this review, the Bank pays particular
attention to the record and outcomes of consultations
with the affected Indigenous Peoples and the social
assessment as a basis for determining whether the
Bank proceeds with project processing. In making
this determination, the Bank also pays particular
attention to the degree to which Indigenous Peoples
support the project.68
Moreover, with regard to commercial exploitation of natu-
ral resources – defined in the OP as “minerals, hydrocarbon
resources, forests, water, and hunting/fishing grounds” – in
indigenous peoples’ territories, paragraph 18 of the OP merely
requires that “the borrower ensures that as part of the consulta-
tion process these indigenous peoples are informed of (a) their
rights to such resources under statutory and customary law; (b)
the scope and nature of such proposed commercial development
and the parties involved or interested in such development; and
(c) the potential effects of such development on their liveli-
hoods, environments, and use of natural resources.” Indigenous
peoples should also share equitably in the benefits in a cultural-
ly appropriate manner and the “benefits, compensation and
rights to due process are at least equivalent to what any
landowner would be entitled to in the case of commercial devel-
opment on their land.”
Whether this language (“broad acceptance” or “broad sup-
port”) could amount to FPIC is dependent on how it will be
operationalized in the OP itself and whether a negative formu-
lation – “will support only” or “will not support” – is
employed.  It is equally dependent on interpreting the language
“broad acceptance” to include decisions reached pursuant to
indigenous peoples’ customary decision making processes and
whether demonstrable acceptance or support is the decisive
factor in determining whether the project moves forward.  The
language in the OP does not presently allow for such an inter-
pretation insofar as it requires only that the Bank “also pays
particular attention to the degree to which Indigenous Peoples
support the project,” thereby implying that their acceptance is
one of a number of factors that will be evaluated.  That this
appears to be the position adopted in the MR is further illus-
trated in the language on involuntary resettlement, which states
that “[t]he WBG will commit to taking the community’s views
on the project into account in determining whether to proceed
with project processing.”69
While the MR may be viewed as an improvement over
the outright rejection of FPIC in the dMR, particularly the lat-
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ter’s reference to domestic law, the WBG’s seemingly cynical
misappropriation and manipulation of FPIC as free, prior and
informed consultation will undoubtedly be condemned by
indigenous peoples.  Concerns will also be raised that apply-
ing (as yet undefined) a “broad community acceptance” stan-
dard undermines indigenous peoples’ internationally guaran-
teed right to consent to activities that affect them and equates
indigenous peoples and their rights to those of any local com-
munity.  In effect, this negates indigenous peoples’ self-deter-
mining status and rights by casting indigenous peoples as no
more than a sub-set of local communities, a term that has lit-
tle meaning and few attendant rights in international law.  As
discussed below, this is also contrary to a large body of
jurisprudence and international practice that holds that FPIC
is the standard that applies to activities affecting indigenous
peoples and their territories, particularly in the context of
extractive industries. 
FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT
WHAT IS FPIC?
FPIC means the consensus/consent of indigenous peoples
determined in accordance with their customary laws and prac-
tices.  This does not necessarily mean that every single member
must agree, but rather that consensus will be determined pur-
suant to customary law and practice.  In some cases, indigenous
peoples may choose to express their consent through procedures
and institutions that are not formally or entirely based on cus-
tomary law and practice, such as statutory councils or tribal gov-
ernments.  Regardless of the nature of the process, the affected
indigenous peoples retain the right to refuse consent or to with-
hold consent until certain conditions are met.  Consent must be
obtained without coercion, prior to commencement of activities,
and after the project proponent’s full disclosure of the intent and
scope of the activity, in language and process understandable to
the affected indigenous peoples and communities.
In its procedural form, FPIC is an administrative process
which enables both the affected indigenous peoples and the proj-
ect proponents to put all their concerns on the table and identify
solutions to problems before the affected groups decide on
whether to give consent.  It may be required in a number of proj-
ect stages, i.e., options assessment, social, cultural and environ-
mental impact assessment, exploration, exploitation, or closure.70
WHY IS FPIC IMPORTANT?
Threats to indigenous peoples’ rights and well-being are par-
ticularly acute in relation to resource exploitation projects, regard-
less of whether the projects are state- or corporate-directed.  Many
of these projects and operations have had and continue to have a
devastating impact on indigenous peoples, undermining their
ability to sustain themselves physically, spiritually, and cultural-
ly.71 Numerous reports confirm that this experience with EI is not
confined to the past and is “one of the major human rights prob-
lems faced by [indigenous peoples] in recent decades.”72
The WBG has also recognized that indigenous peoples
“have often been on the losing end of the development process”
and that the vast majority of development benefits go to others.73
Indeed, the WBG’s first policy on indigenous peoples -
Operational Manual Statement 2.34 Tribal People in Bank-
Financed Projects – was adopted in response to “internal and
external condemnation of the disastrous experiences of indige-
nous groups in Bank-financed projects in the Amazon region.”74
Specifically on EI projects, an internal WBG review observes
that mining and energy projects: “risk and endanger the lives,
assets, and livelihoods of [indigenous peoples]. Moreover, mod-
ern technology allows interventions in hitherto remote areas,
causing significant displacement and irreparable damage to IP
land and assets.  In this context, IP living on these remote and
resource rich lands are particularly vulnerable, because of their
weaker bargaining capacity, and because their customary rights
are not recognized in several countries.”75
Writing as UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous land
rights, Daes observes that:
The legacy of colonialism is probably most acute in the
area of expropriation of indigenous lands, territories
and resources for national economic and development
interests. In every sector of the globe, indigenous peo-
ples are being impeded in every conceivable way from
proceeding with their own forms of development, con-
sistent with their own values, perspectives and interests.
Much large-scale economic and industrial development
has taken place without recognition of and respect for
indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, territories and
resources. Economic development has been largely
imposed from outside, with complete disregard for the
right of indigenous peoples to participate in the control,
implementation and benefits of development.76
For indigenous peoples, secure and effective collective
property rights are fundamental to their economic and social
development, to their physical and cultural integrity, and to their
livelihoods and sustenance. Secure land and resource rights are
also essential for the maintenance of their worldviews and spir-
ituality and, in short, to their very survival as viable territorial
and distinct cultural collectivities.77 The Inter-American Court
of Human Rights recognized this in 2001, stating that:
[T]he close ties of indigenous people with the land must
be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis
of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and
their economic survival.  For indigenous communities,
relations to the land are not merely a matter of posses-
sion and production but a material and spiritual element
that they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultur-
al legacy and transmit it to future generations.78
This multifaceted nature of indigenous peoples’ relation-
ship to land, as well as the relationship between development
and territorial rights, was emphasized by Mary Robinson in her
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December 2001 Presidential Fellow’s Lecture at the World
Bank.  She opines that, for indigenous peoples:  
[E]conomic improvements cannot be envisaged with-
out protection of land and resource rights. Rights over
land need to include recognition of the spiritual rela-
tion indigenous peoples have with their ancestral terri-
tories. And the economic base that land provides needs
to be accompanied by a recognition of indigenous peo-
ples’ own political and legal institutions, cultural tradi-
tions and social organizations. Land and culture, devel-
opment, spiritual values and knowledge are as one. To
fail to recognize one is to fail on all.79
In short, without secure and enforceable rights to lands, ter-
ritories and resources, including the right to control activities
affecting them, indigenous peoples’ means of subsistence, their
identity and survival, and their socio-cultural integrity and eco-
nomic security are permanently threatened.  There is therefore a
complex of interdependent human rights all converging on and
inherent to indigenous peoples’ various relationships with their
traditional lands and territories – lands and territories that form
“the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their
integrity, and their economic survival”80 – as well as their status
as self-determining entities that necessitates a very high stan-
dard of affirmative protection.81 That standard is FPIC, which
is all the more necessary in relation to EI that have proved in
most cases to be highly prejudicial to indigenous peoples’ rights
and well being. 
In addition to respect for human rights guarantees, there are
also a number of practical reasons why FPIC is necessary for
indigenous peoples.  These are clearly related to human rights
guarantees and the underlying rationale for protection.  For
example, decisions about whether and how to exploit natural
resources are normally justified in the national interest, which is
generally interpreted as the interest of the majority.  The result
is that the rights and interests of unrepresented groups, such as
indigenous peoples and others, will often be subordinated to the
majority interest.  Conflict, sometimes violent, often ensues.82
FPIC (in theory at least) guarantees that the rights and interests
of indigenous peoples will be accounted for and respected and
minimizes potential for conflict.  It also provides the basis for
ensuring that indigenous peoples will benefit from any extrac-
tive project on their lands and that negative impacts will be
properly assessed, avoided and mitigated.  
Finally, it may be argued that FPIC makes economic sense
given the costs often incurred in forcing indigenous peoples (and
others) to accept EI projects (police and military expenditures, for
instance), and related to litigation. According to some estimates,
restarting the Panguna copper mine in Bouganville, “where cor-
porate practices were directly implicated in provoking civil war,
allegedly cost [the mining company,] Rio Tinto, $3 billion.”83
WBG studies, as well as other studies, have recognised the eco-
nomic costs of discrimination against indigenous peoples.84
Companies also often place an economic value on their reputa-
tion, i.e. reputational costs, which may be severely damaged in
conflicts with indigenous peoples.  None of these costs are fac-
tored into cost-benefit analyses of WBG investments in EI. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’
RIGHTS TO FPIC  
International human rights law places clear and substantial
obligations on states in connection with resource exploitation on
indigenous lands and territories. Consistent with the Final
Declaration of the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human
Rights,85 the UN Human Rights Committee has stated that a
state’s freedom to encourage economic development is limited
by the obligations it has assumed under international human
rights law.86 The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights has observed that state policy and practice concerning
resource exploitation cannot take place in a vacuum that ignores
its human rights obligations,87 as have the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights88 and other intergovernmental
human rights bodies.89
In contemporary international law, indigenous peoples have
the right to participate in decision making and to give or with-
hold their consent to activities affecting their traditional lands,
territories and resources.  Consent must be freely given,
obtained prior to final authorization and implementation of
activities, and be founded upon an understanding of the full
range of issues implicated by the activity or decision in ques-
tion.  Hence the formulation – free, prior and informed consent
or prior informed consent.
Textual Expressions
Very few international instruments, expressly or impliedly,
contain language detailing the right of indigenous peoples to
FPIC.  Although not spelled out, FPIC is certainly required pur-
suant to the right to self-determination as set forth in Common
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The Extractive Industries
Review’s conclusion that
the World Bank Group is
not “set up to effectively
facilitate and promote
poverty alleviation. . .” is
sobering in light of the
WBG’s mandate.
Article 1 of the International Covenants on Human Rights as
part of indigenous peoples’ right to freely determine their politi-
cal status, freely pursue the economic, social and cultural devel-
opment and freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. 
While the draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, which restates the right to self-determination and spec-
ifies that this is also a right of indigenous peoples, has yet to be
approved, both the UN Human Rights Committee and the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“HRC”)
have applied the right to indigenous peoples with a particular
emphasis on resource rights.  They have both found, for
instance, that unilateral extinguishment of indigenous peoples’
rights to lands and resources contravenes Article 1(2).90 The
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights also found
a violation of this right, as expressed in Article 21 of the African
Charter, in the 2002 Ogoni Case.91 In its complaints-based
jurisprudence, the HRC has also related the right to self-deter-
mination to the right of indigenous peoples (minorities) to enjoy
their culture under Article 27 of the ICCPR.92
International Labour Organization Convention No. 169,
presently the only binding instrument exclusively concerned
with indigenous peoples’ rights, employs different standards
ranging from consultation to participation and, in the case of
relocation, informed consent.  Article 6(2) requires that consul-
tation be undertaken “in good faith … in a form appropriate to
the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or
consent.”  This does not require consent, but does require that it
be the objective of consultations.  This is often overlooked,
including by the ILO, when examining complaints filed by
indigenous peoples,93 but it is an important requirement of the
Convention that establishes, at a minimum, a moral obligation
to seek and obtain consent.94 This provision must be read in
connection with Article 7(1), which provides that “[t]he people
concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for
the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, insti-
tutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or
otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible,
over their own economic, social and cultural development.”    
The Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 8(j),
requires that the traditional knowledge of indigenous and local
communities may only be used with their “approval”, which
has subsequently been interpreted to mean with their prior
informed consent or their FPIC.95 This principle has also
found its way into ongoing CBD work on Access and Benefit
Sharing,96 CBD guidelines on environmental and social impact
assessment97 as well as regional standards on access and bene-
fit sharing adopted by the African Union98 and the Andean
Community.99 Similar language is also found in the
Convention to Combat Desertification.100
Jurisprudence
There is considerably more jurisprudence on FPIC than
there is text in international instruments.  For example, observ-
ing that indigenous peoples “have lost their land and resources
to colonists, commercial companies and State enterprises,”101
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
called upon state-parties to “ensure that members of indigenous
peoples have equal rights in respect of effective participation in
public life, and that no decisions directly relating to their rights
and interests are taken without their informed consent.”102 It
relates the right to informed consent to the right to participate
found in Article 5(c) of the Convention and has made repeated
reference to the preceding language in its decisions and con-
cluding observations.103
In 2001, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights noted “with regret that the traditional lands of
indigenous peoples have been reduced or occupied, without their
consent, by timber, mining and oil companies, at the expense of
the exercise of their culture and the equilibrium of the ecosys-
tem.”104 It then recommended that the state “ensure the partici-
pation of indigenous peoples in decisions affecting their lives.
The Committee particularly urges the State party to consult and
seek the consent of the indigenous peoples concerned …”105
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“IACHR”) has developed considerable jurisprudence on FPIC.
In 1999, finding that Nicaragua had violated, among others, the
right to property by granting logging concessions on indigenous
lands in Nicaragua, the Commission held that the State “is
actively responsible for violations of the right to property … by
granting a concession … without the consent of the Awas Tingni
indigenous community.”106
In the 2002 Mary and Carrie Dann Case, the IACHR found
that Inter-American human rights law requires “special meas-
ures to ensure recognition of the particular and collective inter-
est that indigenous people have in the occupation and use of
their traditional lands and resources and their right not to be
deprived of this interest except with fully informed consent,
under conditions of equality, and with fair compensation.”107 In
this case, the IACHR also declared the existence of a number of
“general international legal principles applicable in the context
of indigenous human rights,” including:
[W]here property and user rights of indigenous peoples
arise from rights existing prior to the creation of a state,
recognition by that state of the permanent and inalien-
able title of indigenous peoples relative thereto and to
have such title changed only by mutual consent
between the state and respective indigenous peoples
when they have full knowledge and appreciation of the
nature or attributes of such property.108
Most recently, the IACHR stated that:
Articles XVIII and XXIII of the American Declaration
specially oblige a member state to ensure that any
determination of the extent to which indigenous
claimants maintain interests in the lands to which they
have traditionally held title and have occupied and
used is based upon a process of fully informed consent
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on the part of the indigenous community as a
whole.[109]  This requires, at a minimum, that all of the
members of the community are fully and accurately
informed of the nature and consequences of the process
and provided with an effective opportunity to partici-
pate individually or as collectives. In the
Commission’s view, these requirements are equally
applicable to decisions by the State that will have an
impact upon indigenous lands and their communities,
such as the granting of concessions to exploit the natu-
ral resources of indigenous territories.110
Indigenous peoples’ right to free and informed consent is
also embraced in the draft declarations on the rights of indige-
nous peoples pending at the UN and OAS. Though still prelim-
inary, these declarations are increasingly cited as expressions of
principles of customary international law.  Article 30 of the UN
draft Declaration provides that:
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and
develop priorities and strategies for the development or
use of their lands, territories and other resources,
including the right to require that states obtain their
free and informed consent prior to the approval of any
project affecting their lands, territories and other
resources, particularly in connection with
the development, utilization or exploitation
of mineral, water or other resources.
While the obligations incumbent on states
have traditionally been the focus of international
human rights law, there is strong evidence in con-
temporary law that obligations to respect human
rights can apply to non-state actors including
multinational corporations.111 This issue is very
relevant in relation to the private sector arm of the
WBG, IFC, and MIGA.  It is also very relevant for
indigenous peoples as most of the EI projects
affecting them are conducted by private corporate
entities authorized by the state.   
The approach adopted by the respective
instruments above is consistent with the observa-
tions of the UN Centre for Transnational
Corporations in a series of reports that examine
the investments and activities of multinational
corporations on indigenous territories.112 The
final report concluded that [multinational compa-
nies’] “performance was chiefly determined by
the quantity and quality of indigenous peoples’
participation in decision making” and “the extent
to which the laws of the host country gave indige-
nous peoples the right to withhold consent to
development….”113
A 2001 UN workshop on indigenous peoples
and natural resources development reiterated and
elaborated upon this conclusion, stating in its conclusions that the
participants, which included industry representatives:
recognized the link between indigenous peoples’ exer-
cise of their right to self determination and rights over
their lands and resources and their capacity to enter into
equitable relationships with the private sector. It was
noted that indigenous peoples with recognized land and
resource rights and peoples with treaties, agreements or
other constructive arrangements with States, were bet-
ter able to enter into fruitful relations with private sec-
tor natural resource companies on the basis of free,
prior, informed consent than peoples without such rec-
ognized rights.114
The recent UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights’ Norms on Transnational
Corporations are more direct:
Transnational corporations and other business enterprises
shall respect the rights of local communities affected by their
activities and the rights of indigenous peoples and commu-
nities consistent with international human rights stan-
dards…. They shall also respect the principle of free, prior
and informed consent of the indigenous peoples and com-
munities to be affected by their development projects.115
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BOX 1: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE
ACCEPTED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHT TO FPIC
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
UN Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations
UN Development Programme
UN Centre for Transnational Corporations
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on situation of
the rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people 
Convention on Biological Diversity
Convention to Combat Desertification, particularly in Africa
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Inter-American Development Bank
Andean Community
European Council of Ministers
European Commission
Organization of African Unity
World Commission on Dams
World Bank Extractive Industries Review
IUCN Vth World Parks Congress
Forest Stewardship Council
World Wildlife Fund
International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation
Association and the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers
Similar statements on FPIC have been made by UN Special
Rapporteurs on indigenous land rights, treaties concluded
between states and indigenous peoples, and indigenous peoples’
intellectual and cultural heritage, as well as by the Commission
on Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur on the rights and funda-
mental freedoms of indigenous people.116 The UN Working
Group on Indigenous Populations, pursuant to its standard set-
ting mandate, is commencing the elaboration of a legal com-
mentary on FPIC in relation to development activities affecting
indigenous peoples’ lands and natural resources.117 A working
paper will be submitted by one of its members and discussed at
the 22nd session in July 2004.  The UN Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues has also supported the right of FPIC and has
proposed that a Working Group be established to provide guid-
ance on its implementation.118
Finally, both general and treaty-based international law
requires indigenous peoples’ FPIC in connection with resettle-
ment.120 As early as 1984, the IACHR found that “the prepon-
derant doctrine” holds that the principle of consent is of general
application to cases involving relocation.121 Involuntary reset-
tlement of indigenous peoples is not however prohibited by
WBG policy.  OP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement provides
that the WBG will finance activities involving resettlement,
even resulting in “significant adverse impacts on [indigenous
peoples’] cultural survival,” if it is satisfied that the borrower
has explored all feasible project design alternatives.122
From the preceding it can be seen that FPIC is an established
feature of international human rights norms and standard setting
activities pertaining to indigenous peoples.  Opponents of FPIC
argue that it conflicts with States’ powers of eminent domain and
is therefore unacceptable.  However, eminent domain is subject
to human rights law in the same way as any other prerogative of
state and, therefore, should not be granted any special status or
exemption, in this case, to justify denial of the right of FPIC.123
The same may also be said of the argument that FPIC contra-
venes state sovereignty in general, including state sovereignty
over natural resources.  As stated by Judge Weeramantry of the
International Court of Justice, “[i]n its ongoing development, the
concept of human rights has long passed the stage when it was a
narrow parochial concern between sovereign and subject. …
[T]here is not even the semblance of a suggestion in contempo-
rary international law that [human rights] obligations amount to
a derogation of sovereignty.”124
FPIC IN DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS
A number of intergovernmental development agencies and
international financial institutions have incorporated FPIC lan-
guage into their policies and programmes on indigenous peo-
ples.  I have included these here as they represent evidence of
state practice.  
The United Nations Development Programme’s (“UNDP”)
official policy on indigenous peoples states unequivocally that
the “UNDP promotes and supports the right of indigenous peo-
ples to free, prior informed consent with regard to development
planning and programming that may affect them.”125 The poli-
cy grounds UNDP’s support for FPIC in international human
rights law.  The Inter-American Development Bank’s (“IDB”)
1990 Strategies and Procedures on Socio-Cultural Issues as
Related to the Environment provides that “in general the IDB
will not support … projects affecting tribal lands, unless the
tribal society is in agreement….”126 The IDB is presently for-
mulating a binding operational policy on indigenous peoples.
Preliminary strategy papers on this policy include FPIC.127
FPIC is already included in the IDB’s policy on Involuntary
Resettlement.128
The European Union (“EU”) Council of Ministers’ 1998
Resolution entitled Indigenous Peoples within the framework of
the development cooperation of the Community and Member
States provides that “indigenous peoples have the right to
choose their own development paths, which includes the right to
object to projects, in particular in their traditional areas.”129
The EU interprets this language to be the equivalent of FPIC.130
Additionally, in October 2003, the European Council and
Commission approved, as part of the Second Northern
Dimension Action Plan, the following language: “Strengthened
attention to be paid by all Northern Dimension partners to
indigenous interests in relation to economic activities, and in
particular extractive industry, with a view to protecting inherit-
ed rights of self-determination, land rights and cultural rights of
indigenous peoples of the region.”131 As noted above, FPIC is
implicit in and fundamental to the right to self-determination.
The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (“PFII”),
established in 2001 is mandated to coordinate system-wide
attention to indigenous peoples’ issues within the United
Nations.  It has taken a strong interest in FPIC, which it says
“has emerged as the desired standard to be applied in protecting
and promoting [indigenous peoples’] rights in the development
process.”132 The PFII has also taken an interest in WBG poli-
cies as they relate to indigenous peoples, recommending in
2003, reiterated verbatim in 2004, that the WBG:
Continue  to  address  issues  currently  outstanding,
including  Bank implementation of international cus-
tomary laws and  standards,  in  particular  human
rights  instruments,  full  recognition  of  customary
land  and  resource  rights  of indigenous  peoples,
recognition  of  the  right  of  free,  prior  informed  con-
sent  of indigenous peoples regarding development
projects that affect them, and prohibition of the invol-
untary resettlement of indigenous peoples.133
The EIR specifically proposed that the WBG collaborate
with the PFII to operationalize and incorporate FPIC into its
policies and practice.134
In preparation for its 3rd session, the PFII distributed a
questionnaire to all UN system “Indigenous Peoples Focal
Points” in order to gather information about “how the principle
of FPIC is understood and applied by United Nations pro-
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grammes, funds, agencies.”135 Of the eighteen UN organs that
received the questionnaire, ten replied. The WBG was conspic-
uously absent, especially considering its membership in the
PFII’s Inter-Agency Support Group.136 While none of the
responding organs had an official, working definition of FPIC,
all recognized it as being embedded in the human rights frame-
work and most maintained, while not without challenges, that
they “to a large extent implemented [FPIC] on an ad-hoc basis
in line with the general guidelines, legal instruments and princi-
ples through which they work.”137 A cursory reading of some
of the responses however shows that some of the organs confuse
FPIC with consultation and participation.
FPIC and Sub-Soil Rights
The preceding discussion of FPIC should be read in light of
the failure of most states to recognize the rights of indigenous
peoples to subsoil minerals and other resources pertaining to
their traditional lands and territories, particularly as FPIC is
viewed by some as a mechanism to avoid much more sensitive
and politically charged discussions about indigenous ownership
of the subsoil.  As discussed below, international human rights
bodies and tribunals have consistently held that the collective
rights of indigenous peoples to their traditional lands and
resources must be recognized and protected.  These rights exist
absent formal recognition by the state, are in large measure
determined by indigenous peoples’ laws, customs and usages,
and unilateral extinguishment has been determined to violate,
among others, the right to self-determination and the prohibition
of racial discrimination.138 These norms have been developed
in part to address the legacy of historic injustices dating back to
the early days of colonialism.
In the language employed in the various international
instruments and jurisprudence, the term “resources” is used
without qualification or explanation.  Without evidence to the
contrary – ILO 169, Article 15(2), for instance, which provides
for “cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or
sub-surface resources” – “resources” should presumptively be
understood to include subsoil resources, particularly as these
resources were unilaterally expropriated by colonial powers and
their successors in the same manner that surface rights were
deemed vested in the sovereign in the colonial era.139
International law has rejected this unilateral expropriation with
regard to surface rights; the same analysis should be applied to
subsoil rights.  The South African Constitutional Court, among
others, reached this conclusion in 2003, holding that under
indigenous law and by virtue of traditional occupation and use
ownership of subsoil minerals may also vest collectively in
indigenous peoples.140
In the absence of statutory or other arrangements providing
otherwise, recognition of indigenous ownership of subsoil min-
erals obviates any right of the state to issue concessions on
indigenous lands and the need for FPIC in relation thereto.141
Instead, indigenous peoples, should they so choose, would be
free to consent to arrangements with third parties, including the
state, for the exploitation of their resources through mutually
acceptable agreements.  Reviews and analyses of examples of
such agreements in the United States, Canada and elsewhere
would be useful for fully understanding the nature and func-
tioning of FPIC generally.     
“OPERATIONALIZATION”
While there is a need to ensure that FPIC is further
entrenched in human rights law, and in turn that human rights
law is better integrated into other areas of international law, par-
ticularly trade law, there is equally a need to develop interna-
tional standards on the implementation or “operationalization” of
FPIC.  It has sometimes been argued that the World Bank Group
cannot incorporate FPIC into its policies and projects because it
cannot be operationalized.  This is a dubious assertion at best,
given the numerous examples of where the right has been opera-
tionalized by international organizations and in national laws.142
The IDB, for instance, requires indigenous peoples’ consent to
resettlement as do, among others, the domestic laws of most
states that have ratified ILO 169.  With regard to access, benefit
sharing, and protection of indigenous knowledge, the Secretariat
of the Convention on Biological Diversity reported that as of
December 2000, FPIC was incorporated into the law, either draft
or existing, and practice of 62 countries.143
In the Philippines, indigenous peoples’ FPIC is required
by law for the following activities: exploration, development
and use of natural resources, research-bio-prospecting, dis-
placement and relocation, archaeological explorations, poli-
cies affecting indigenous peoples, and entry of military per-
sonnel.144 FPIC is defined in the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
Act 1997 as “the consensus of all members of the [Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples] to be determined
in accordance with their respective customary laws and prac-
tices, free from any external manipulation, interference and
coercion, and obtained after fully disclosing the intent and
scope of the activity, in a language and process understandable
to the community.”145
The consent provisions of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
Act of 1997 (“IPRA”) are operationalized in its Implementing
Rules and Regulations 1998.146 The “basic elements” of the
process for seeking FPIC include, at a minimum, information
dissemination to all members of the affected indigenous peo-
ples, assessment of their concerns or issues in accordance with
their customs and traditions, an initial decision by the recog-
nized council of elders, and affirmation of the decision of the
elders by the members of the community.147
Should consent be granted, a written memorandum of
agreement, signed by the proponent, affected indigenous
communities, and the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples, is required.  This agreement must be in the relevant
indigenous languages and stipulate, among other factors: (1)
the benefits due to the affected indigenous people/communi-
ty, (2) measures to protect indigenous peoples’ rights and
value systems,148 (3) the responsibilities of the proponent, the
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indigenous people/community and the NCIP, (4) that the
agreement applies mutatis mutandis to any new parties as a
result of partnership, joint venture, merger, transfer of rights,
etc., and (5) penalties for non-compliance and or violation of
the agreement.149
FPIC also has been part of the law applying to mining in
Australia’s Northern Territory for almost 30 years150 and is
present in legislation applicable in New South Wales,151
Queensland, 152 and other states.153 Under the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (“ALRA”), consent is
obtained through statutory, indigenous-controlled Land
Councils, which may not consent to a mining license unless they
are satisfied that the traditional Aboriginal owners of the land in
question understand the nature of the activity and any terms or
conditions. As a group they must give consent after they are sat-
isfied that the terms and conditions are reasonable and have
agreed upon these terms and conditions with the miner.154 With
regard to the traditional land owners, consent is considered to
have been obtained if:
(a) In a case where there is a particular process of
decision making that, under the tradition of those
Aboriginal owners or of the group to which they
belong, must be complied with in relation to deci-
sions of that kind – the decision was made in
accordance with that process; or
(b) In a case where there is no such process of deci-
sion making – the decision was made in accor-
dance with a process agreed to and adopted by tra-
ditional Aboriginal owners in relation to the deci-
sion or in relation to decisions of that kind.155
The procedure applied under the ALRA is roughly as fol-
lows: an application is made to the Department of Business,
Industry and Resource Development (“DBIRD”) for an explo-
ration license; the DBIRD Minister approves the applicant to
enter into negotiations with a Land Council; the Land Council
has 12 months to complete its responsibilities under the ALRA,
(e.g., consultation with affected traditional Aboriginal land own-
ers); and ultimately, if traditional owners agree, an agreement
for an exploration license is negotiated.156
These procedures were reviewed by the National Institute
of Economic and Industry Research in 1999,157 which, accord-
ing to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission,
found that the ALRA “has been successful in safeguarding
Aboriginal control over Aboriginal land … [and] has also pro-
vided a process of negotiation by which an increasing propor-
tion of Aboriginal land in the Territory has been made available
for mineral exploration.”158 In 1991, there were 12 producing
mines on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory, which
together produced more than A$1 billion of minerals or 80% of
the total value of the NT’s mineral production.159
Finally, it is important to note that the IFC’s Social and
Environmental Review Procedure (“Micro-Finance Exclusion
List”) already contains an “informed consent” requirement in
relation to indigenous peoples stating that IFC funds may not be
used to finance “production or activities that impinge on the
lands owned, or claimed under adjudication, by indigenous peo-
ples, without full documented consent of such peoples.”160
Therefore, there would seem to be no valid reason preventing
FPIC from being operationalized in other World Bank Group
settings and projects.
COMPONENTS OF FPIC
FPIC has a number of elements that need to be accounted
for in its operationalization: 1) free, 2) prior, 3) informed, and 4)
consent.  To this obvious list, I would add a fifth component:
adequate recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights to their
lands, territories, and resources traditionally owned or otherwise
occupied and used.  The following are examples of what may be
required under each component.
Free
A general principle of law is that consent is not valid if
obtained through coercion or manipulation.  While no legisla-
tive or regulatory measure is foolproof, mechanisms need to be
established to verify that consent has been freely obtained. In
the Philippines, for instance, the National Commission of
Indigenous Peoples is charged with certifying the consent of
indigenous communities. Nonetheless, studies demonstrate that
in the Philippines, indigenous peoples’ consent is often still
manipulated and coerced.161 Similar complaints have been
raised in Australia.162
A. Goldzimer proposes that one way of ensuring that FPIC
is “freely” obtained is to ensure that the project proponent is not
the entity responsible for obtaining consent.163 Rather, the
responsibility should be vested in constitutionally recognized,
independent (politically and financially), centralized or region-
alized bodies directly elected by indigenous peoples and addi-
tionally, indigenous peoples must have access to effective judi-
cial remedies to further safeguard against misconduct in the
FPIC process.164
The Land Councils established in the Northern Territory
and elsewhere in Australia work largely along these lines.
Despite some initial problems – and allegations of co-optation,
not to mention that they derive part of their income from mining
royalties and are government-funded – they seem to have
worked well, at least in terms of providing a mechanism for
seeking FPIC and minimizing possibilities for coercion or
manipulation.  Indigenous peoples in Guyana – whose right to
FPIC is contained in a policy on mining rather than legislation
– have also proposed that their National Toshaos Council (a
body representing all of the elected village chiefs) is involved in
either certifying or obtaining FPIC given allegations that com-
panies have manipulated or bribed members of their Village
Councils, the bodies presently designated to provide consent.165
Whether such a system would work everywhere, however,
is debatable and presents particular challenges for countries and
regions where the rule of law is weak, corruption prevalent, and
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where indigenous peoples’ institutions and organizations are
weak or suppressed.  Moreover, great care is required to ensure
that indigenous peoples’ traditional institutions and customary
laws are fully respected and not supplanted in such a system
unless they choose otherwise.  The potential for this to occur
was noted in a WBG  evaluation of its indigenous peoples poli-
cy, which concluded that “participation in the majority of proj-
ects took place through modern state structures, such as village
level health or education committees; field assessments indicate
that these project structures created new power relations, weak-
ening traditional IP communities.”166
Prior
To be meaningful, informed consent must be sought suffi-
ciently in advance of any final authorization by the State, third
parties, or commencement of activities by a company that
affects indigenous peoples and their lands, territories, and
resources. The consent process should also be time-bound so as
to ensure that the affected peoples have enough time to under-
stand the information received, request additional information
or clarification, seek advice, determine or negotiate conditions,
and ensure that the process does not serve as an undue impedi-
ment for the proponent seeking consent.  In Australia, for
example, a twelve month period has been legislated.  The
appropriate amount of time needed, however, may vary
depending on such factors as the number of affected persons,
communities or peoples, the complexity of the proposed activ-
ity, and the amount of information provided or requested.
Whatever the amount of time needed, a pre-determined and
clear deadline is important.
Informed
An FPIC procedure must involve consultation and partici-
pation by affected indigenous peoples, which includes the full
and legally accurate disclosure of information concerning pro-
posed developments in a form that is both accessible and under-
standable to them.  Consultation, participation, and access to
information rights are well established in international human
rights law167 and international environmental law.168
A report done for the Convention on Biological Diversity’s
ad hoc inter-sessional Working Group on Article 8j and related
provisions includes the following list of information that must
be disclosed as part of an FPIC process:  
• The nature, size, and scope of the proposed devel-
opment or activity;
• The duration of the development (including the con-
struction phase) or the activity;
• The locality of areas that will be affected;
• A preliminary assessment of the likely impact of the
development; 
• The reasons/purpose for the development;
• Personnel likely to be involved in both construction
and operational phases (including local people,
research institutes, sponsors, commercial interests,
and partners as possible third parties and beneficiar-
ies) of the development process;
• Specific procedures the development or activity
would entail;
• Potential risks involved (e.g., entry into sacred
areas, environmental pollution, partial destruction of
a significant site, disturbance of a breeding ground); 
• The full implications that can realistically be foreseen
(e.g., commercial, economic environmental, cultural); 
• Conditions for third party involvement.169
The 1998 IPRA Implementing Rules and Regulations
adopted in the Philippines require that project proponents shall:
• Submit to the IP community a written undertaking in
a language spoken and understood by the communi-
ty concerned, stating that it shall commit itself to full
disclosure of records and information relevant to the
policy, program, project or activity, and allow full
access to records, documents, material information
and facilities pertinent to the same;
• Submit to the IP community and the NCIP in a lan-
guage understandable to the concerned community an
Environmental and Socio-cultural Impact Statement,
detailing all the possible impact of the policy, pro-
gram, project or activity upon the ecological, eco-
nomic, social and cultural aspect of the community as
a whole. Such document shall clearly indicate how
adverse impacts can be avoided or mitigated;
• Submit an undertaking in writing to answer for dam-
ages which the ICCs/IPs may suffer on account of
the policy, program, project, plan, or activity and
deposit a cash bond or post a surety bond with the
NCIP when required by the community equivalent
to a percentage of its investments, subject to pro-
gressive increase, depending upon the impact of the
project. The amount of bond shall be determined by
the NCIP with the concurrence of the ICCs/IPs con-
cerned; and
• Underwrite all expenses attendant to securing the
free and prior informed consent of ICCs/IPs.170
In all cases, provision of misleading or false information
can result in a penalty or denial of consent for the proposed
development to proceed or revocation of consent if the activity
has commenced.
Consent
The process of arriving at a consent decision involves con-
sultation and meaningful participation in all aspects of the
assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring, and closure
of a project.  As such, consultation and meaningful participation
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are also fundamental components of a consent process.
Negotiation may also be needed to reach agreement on the pro-
posal as a whole, certain components thereof, or conditions that
may be attached to the granting of FPIC.  At all times, indige-
nous peoples have the right to participate through their own
freely chosen representatives and to identify the persons, com-
munities, or other entities that may require special measures in
relation to consultation and participation.  They also have the
right to secure and use the services of any advisors they may
require, including legal counsel of their choice.
Indigenous peoples should specify which entity will
express consent on their behalf.  This may vary depending on
the activity in question. For example, under the relevant cus-
tomary law, the entity to give or withhold consent may be the
traditional authorities of a particular landholding clan. In other
cases, it may be the indigenous people as a whole or a combi-
nation of entities.  As with the Land Councils in Australia, this
may also be done through an extra-community/people institu-
tion.  The IPRA Implementing Rules and Regulations contain
specific rules on this issue:
The scope of the ICCs/IPs whose free and prior
informed consent is required shall depend upon the
impact area of the proposed policy, program, projects
and plans, such that:
a) When the policy, program, project or plan affects
only the particular community within the ancestral
domain, only such community shall give their free and
prior informed consent;
b) When the policy, program, project or plan affects
the entire ancestral domain, the consent of the con-
cerned ICCs/IPs within the ancestral domain shall be
secured; and
c) When the policy, program, project or plan affects a
whole range of territories covering two or more ances-
tral domains, the consent of all affected ICCs/IP com-
munities shall be secured.171
FPIC should be documented in legally binding and enforce-
able agreements that set forth any associated terms and condi-
tions, as well as the enforcement and reparations mechanisms to
address and remedy violations.  Finally, FPIC must be based on
specific activities for which consent has been granted.  While con-
sent may initially be granted for one set of activities, any intend-
ed change of activities will require a new application for FPIC.
Recognition and Regularization of Rights to Lands,
Territories and Resources
FPIC is dependent on clear recognition and protection of
indigenous peoples’ rights, particularly to lands, territories and
resources traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used.
Without full recognition of indigenous peoples’ territorial rights,
FPIC will not fully provide the protection is it designed to pro-
vide.  In this sense, it is important to note that under interna-
tional law indigenous peoples’ territorial rights arise from and
are grounded in indigenous custom and practice and exist inde-
pendently of formal recognition by the states.172 States are obli-
gated to delimit, demarcate, and title indigenous lands and terri-
tories in accordance with their customary laws and values. 
While this may seem an obvious point, it is not uncommon
for states to limit FPIC to lands that are legally recognized by
their own legal systems rather than the lands and territories tra-
ditionally owned by indigenous peoples.  In many cases, there is
a large disparity between the two categories, and requiring FPIC
only in connection with the former potentially exempts large
areas of indigenous lands from the FPIC requirement.  In
Guyana, for instance, FPIC applies only to “recognized” or
titled lands.  Under this scheme, approximately three-quarters of
the lands traditionally owned and presently claimed by indige-
nous people are excluded.  The same also applies in the case of
the Northern Territory, where FPIC applies to aboriginal lands
recognized under the ALRA, but not to lands that they may own
pursuant to the 1993 Native Title Act (Cth), as amended in 1998.
With regard to the latter, a “right to negotiate” applies, not FPIC,
subject to arbitration if agreement cannot be reached.173
CONCLUSION
The EIR review of the WBG raises fundamental questions
about the role, operations, and impact of the institution.  Its con-
clusion that the WBG is not “set up to effectively facilitate and
promote poverty alleviation through sustainable development”
is sobering in light of the WBG’s professed mandate and indi-
cates that major institutional changes are required.174 While the
issues raised by the EIR centre around the WBG’s involvement
in EI, they could apply equally to other sectors, as many of the
EIR’s main recommendations – respect for human rights, for
instance – are cross-cutting, affecting most if not all areas of
WBG activity.  
The EIR also raises serious questions about the mining and
oil industries’ claims that their operations are sustainable and
contribute to poverty alleviation, rather than the well-being of
primarily urban elites in the source country and of company
shareholders, who are usually located far away from the extrac-
tion sites.175 As the EIR concludes in relation to the WBG, but
applying equally to industry, EI may contribute to poverty alle-
viation through sustainable development, but only if certain
conditions are met and strictly adhered to and enforced. These
conditions include respect for human rights broadly and indige-
nous peoples’ rights specifically.      
The EIR is also the second major review of the WBG in the
past few years to have highlighted the need for the WBG to
incorporate and adhere to indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC in
its policies, programmes, and projects.  This is framed by both a
general need to address human rights – something the WBG has
been unwilling to do to date, citing the prohibition of interfer-
ence in political affairs contained in its Articles of Agreement –
and a specific recognition of the need to ensure that indigenous
peoples’ rights to lands, territories, and resources are guaranteed
57 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
and respected, not only in specific WBG projects, but also in
relation to technical assistance loans and structural adjustment
programmes.176 The latter are arguably more important than
project conditionality, given the WBG’s role in promoting and
assisting with the liberalization of mining, investment, and other
laws across the world.   
FPIC is both an internationally recognized right of indige-
nous peoples and a mechanism to ensure that their other rights
and interests will be respected.  It is an indispensable guarantee
for indigenous peoples in connection with EI, given the devas-
tating impact that most EI operations have had and in some
cases continue to have for their well being, territories, and cul-
tural survival.  FPIC is also increasingly being incorporated into
development-related policies and standards, and should be con-
sidered a fundamental component of development effectiveness
in much the same way that consultation and participation are
considered fundamental.  The WBG MR appears to accept this
as true, stating that “[p]rojects that are accepted by communities
are going to be more effective both for communities and for
developers.”177 Examples from Australia, the Philippines and
elsewhere show that FPIC can be operationalized and work in
practice. This is not to say that there have not been and will not
continue to be problems with implementation of FPIC process-
es, but the same can also be said for consultation and participa-
tion in general, and this should not excuse failure to comply
with and implement the right. 
As the author of UNDP’s 2004 Human Development Report
observes in a letter responding to criticism of the EIR’s recom-
mendations sent by a prominent industry representative,178 FPIC
is both “practical and necessary.”179 She continues that: 
Success stories exist in Alaska, Australia and Canada,
where local communities were brought into decision-
making processes - they were able to preserve their
way of life even while sharing the profits from mining
projects. Why should similar initiatives not be adopted
for developing countries?  As the Human Development
Report 2004 (which is due in July 2004) will demon-
strate, ignoring demands of indigenous people may
have worked in earlier decades but cannot in today’s
political realities. There would be a high cost if local
communities were left out. Much of future investments
in extractive industries are expected to be in indige-
nous people’s territories. Investments that take away
the economic basis of their livelihoods threaten their
very existence. The Lihir gold mine’s operations in
Papua New Guinea destroyed sacred sites and led to
environmental degradation. Not surprisingly, many
communities increasingly oppose any further activity
in their territories because of their past experience of
misinformation and inadequate compensation. …In the
interest of long-term sustainability and profitability of
investments, empowering communities requires
explicitly recognising their rights, consulting them on
project design and creating incentives for increasing
mutual benefits. This is a matter of respecting human
rights as well as a practical necessity.180
On the last point, the UN Millennium Declaration, which
laid the foundation for the Millennium Development Goals, one
of the primary focal points of development efforts and targets
today, proclaims that the world’s leaders “will spare no effort to
promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as
respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, including the right to development.”181
One place they can do this is as shareholders in and board mem-
bers of the WBG. 
Finally, the EIR Report raises the important issue of
whether the World Bank, as a subject of international law, has
international legal obligations to promote and respect human
rights rather than simply moral- or policy-based obligations.
Much has been written on this issue in recent years, and many
scholars have concluded that the WBG does indeed have legal
obligations with regard to human rights.182 For example,
Bowett’s Law of International Institutions states that “[i]t has
been suggested, for example, that the World Bank is not subject
to general international norms for the protection of fundamental
human rights. In our view that conclusion is without merit, on
legal or policy grounds ….”183
A number of UN studies have also looked at this issue and
concluded that the WBG has obligations with respect to human
rights law, and that it has not paid sufficient attention to human
rights.184 One of these studies concluded with respect to the
WBG that “[n]o entity that claims international legal personali-
ty can claim exemption from that [human rights] regime. … If
such a claim were to be considered legitimate, it would serious-
ly erode the international rule of law.”185
Irrespective of how the WBG eventually addresses the con-
clusions and recommendations made by Dr. Salim in the EIR, the
issue of WBG human rights obligations and the implications
thereof for its operations and policies requires further attention.
This is not to say that WBG practice cannot or should not exceed
any obligations it may have under international law, clearly there
are important policy reasons for addressing human rights issues,
not the least of which is improving development effectiveness
and poverty alleviation efforts.  As the UN General Assembly
resolved in 1997: “democracy, respect for all human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the right to development, trans-
parent and accountable governance in all sectors of society, as
well as effective participation by civil society, are … an essential
part of the necessary foundations for the realization of social and
people-centred sustainable development.”186
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